We now include the prelude in so many places, this simplifies how we can
present how `cargo-test-support` works.
Yes, this included some `use` clean ups but its already painful enough
walking through every test file, I didn't want to do it twice.
Once we support packaging workspaces with dependencies, dependency
packages need to be built before anything is verified. In addition to a
little refactoring, this commit reorders the console messages so that
package metadata (archive size, etc.) is reported before verification
results.
Co-Authored-By: Tor Hovland <55164+torhovland@users.noreply.github.com>
While this is noisy and hides other deprecations, I figured deprecations would
make it easier for people to discover what tasks remain and allow us to
divide and conquer this work rather than doing a heroic PR.
In theory, this will be short lived and we'll go back to seeing
deprecations in our tests.
fix(toml): Convert warnings that `licence` and `readme` files do not exist into errors
### What does this PR try to resolve?
In this PR:
- Changed the warning to a hard error and modified the associated test function;
- Removed what should have been a redundant test function：`publish::publish_with_missing_readme`；
- Since `cargo publish` is preceded by the execution of `cargo package`, the error message in the test `function bad_license_file` needs to be modified.
issue: https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/issues/13629#license-file-and-readme-pointing-to-a-non-existent-file.
### Additional information
It seems that this is not enough, the current situation is that `cargo package` warns if `package.readme` is an empty string or the wrong file location, but if I cancel `package.readme`, no warning is generated.
I'm wondering if I should judge `package.readme&licence` when executing `cargo package` and return an error if it doesn't exist?
As this has not been done before, your advice is sought.
This is to help with #9930
Example changes:
```diff
-[LOCKING] 4 packages
+[LOCKING] 4 packages to latest version
-[LOCKING] 2 packages
+[LOCKING] 2 packages to latest Rust 1.60.0 compatible versions
-[LOCKING] 2 packages
+[LOCKING] 2 packages to earliest versions
```
Benefits
- The package count is of "added" packages and this makes that more
logically clear
- This gives users transparency into what is happening, especially with
- what rust-version is use
- the transition to this feature in the new edition
- whether the planned config was applied or not (as I don't want it to
require an MSRV bump)
- Will make it easier in tests to show what changed
- Provides more motiviation to show this message in `cargo update` and
`cargo install` (that will be explored in a follow up PR)
This does come at the cost of more verbose output but hopefully not too
verbose. This is why I left off other factors, like avoid-dev-deps.
Generally, cargo avoids positional arguments. Mostly for the commands
that might forward arguments to another command, like `cargo test`.
It also allows some flexibility in turning flags into options.
For `cargo add` and `cargo remove`, we decided to accept positionals
because the motivations didn't seem to apply as much (similar to `cargo
install`).
This applies the pattern to `cargo update` as well which is in the same
category of commands as `cargo add` and `cargo remove`.
As for `--help` formatting, I'm mixed on whether `[SPEC]...` should be at the top like
other positionals or should be relegated to "Package selection". I went
with the latter mostly to make it easier to visualize the less common
choice.
Switching to a positional for `cargo update` (while keeping `-p` for
backwards compatibility) was referenced in #12425.
In 1.71, `.cargo-ok` changed to contain a JSON `{ v: 1 }` to indicate
the version of it. A failure of parsing will result in a heavy-hammer
approach that unpacks the `.crate` file again. This is in response to a
security issue that the unpacking didn't respect umask on Unix systems.
Without this, an attacker can leverage globally writable files buried
in the `.crate` file. After a user downloaded and unpacked the file,
the attacker can then write malicous code to the downloaded sources.
The headers can significantly contribute to noise in the output,
drowning out the rest of the output. Most investigation will likely be
focused on the case where cargo completely fails to download, so this
only shows the full detail in the final error message.
