net: add UdpSocket::peek_sender() (#5520)

tokio/Cargo.toml

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ num_cpus = { version = "1.8.0", optional = true }
 parking_lot = { version = "0.12.0", optional = true }
 
 [target.'cfg(not(any(target_arch = "wasm32", target_arch = "wasm64")))'.dependencies]
-socket2 = { version = "0.4.4", optional = true, features = [ "all" ] }
+socket2 = { version = "0.4.9", optional = true, features = [ "all" ] }
 
 # Currently unstable. The API exposed by these features may be broken at any time.
 # Requires `--cfg tokio_unstable` to enable.
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ mockall = "0.11.1"
 async-stream = "0.3"
 
 [target.'cfg(not(any(target_arch = "wasm32", target_arch = "wasm64")))'.dev-dependencies]
-socket2 = "0.4"
+socket2 = "0.4.9"
 tempfile = "3.1.0"
 
 [target.'cfg(not(all(any(target_arch = "wasm32", target_arch = "wasm64"), target_os = "unknown")))'.dev-dependencies]

tokio/src/net/udp.rs

@@ -954,6 +954,15 @@ impl UdpSocket {
         /// When there is no pending data, `Err(io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock)` is
         /// returned. This function is usually paired with `readable()`.
         ///
+        /// # Notes
+        /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+        /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+        /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+        /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+        /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+        ///
+        /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+        ///
         /// # Examples
         ///
         /// ```no_run
@@ -1177,6 +1186,15 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     ///     Ok(())
     /// }
     /// ```
+    ///
+    /// # Notes
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
     pub async fn recv_from(&self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<(usize, SocketAddr)> {
         self.io
             .registration()
@@ -1201,6 +1219,15 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     /// # Errors
     ///
     /// This function may encounter any standard I/O error except `WouldBlock`.
+    ///
+    /// # Notes
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
     pub fn poll_recv_from(
         &self,
         cx: &mut Context<'_>,
@@ -1233,6 +1260,16 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     /// When there is no pending data, `Err(io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock)` is
     /// returned. This function is usually paired with `readable()`.
     ///
+    /// # Notes
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+    ///
     /// # Examples
     ///
     /// ```no_run
@@ -1367,6 +1404,17 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     /// Make sure to always use a sufficiently large buffer to hold the
     /// maximum UDP packet size, which can be up to 65536 bytes in size.
     ///
+    /// MacOS will return an error if you pass a zero-sized buffer.
+    ///
+    /// If you're merely interested in learning the sender of the data at the head of the queue,
+    /// try [`peek_sender`].
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
     /// # Examples
     ///
     /// ```no_run
@@ -1385,6 +1433,9 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     ///     Ok(())
     /// }
     /// ```
+    ///
+    /// [`peek_sender`]: method@Self::peek_sender
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
     pub async fn peek_from(&self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<(usize, SocketAddr)> {
         self.io
             .registration()
@@ -1393,7 +1444,7 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     }
 
     /// Receives data from the socket, without removing it from the input queue.
-    /// On success, returns the number of bytes read.
+    /// On success, returns the sending address of the datagram.
     ///
     /// # Notes
     ///
@@ -1407,6 +1458,17 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     /// Make sure to always use a sufficiently large buffer to hold the
     /// maximum UDP packet size, which can be up to 65536 bytes in size.
     ///
+    /// MacOS will return an error if you pass a zero-sized buffer.
+    ///
+    /// If you're merely interested in learning the sender of the data at the head of the queue,
+    /// try [`poll_peek_sender`].
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
     /// # Return value
     ///
     /// The function returns:
@@ -1418,6 +1480,9 @@ impl UdpSocket {
     /// # Errors
     ///
     /// This function may encounter any standard I/O error except `WouldBlock`.
+    ///
+    /// [`poll_peek_sender`]: method@Self::poll_peek_sender
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
     pub fn poll_peek_from(
         &self,
         cx: &mut Context<'_>,
@@ -1440,6 +1505,117 @@ impl UdpSocket {
         Poll::Ready(Ok(addr))
     }
 
+    /// Tries to receive data on the socket without removing it from the input queue.
+    /// On success, returns the number of bytes read and the sending address of the
+    /// datagram.
+    ///
+    /// When there is no pending data, `Err(io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock)` is
+    /// returned. This function is usually paired with `readable()`.
+    ///
+    /// # Notes
+    ///
+    /// On Windows, if the data is larger than the buffer specified, the buffer
+    /// is filled with the first part of the data, and peek returns the error
+    /// WSAEMSGSIZE(10040). The excess data is lost.
+    /// Make sure to always use a sufficiently large buffer to hold the
+    /// maximum UDP packet size, which can be up to 65536 bytes in size.
+    ///
+    /// MacOS will return an error if you pass a zero-sized buffer.
+    ///
+    /// If you're merely interested in learning the sender of the data at the head of the queue,
+    /// try [`try_peek_sender`].
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [`try_peek_sender`]: method@Self::try_peek_sender
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+    pub fn try_peek_from(&self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> io::Result<(usize, SocketAddr)> {
+        self.io
+            .registration()
+            .try_io(Interest::READABLE, || self.io.peek_from(buf))
+    }
+
+    /// Retrieve the sender of the data at the head of the input queue, waiting if empty.
+    ///
+    /// This is equivalent to calling [`peek_from`] with a zero-sized buffer,
+    /// but suppresses the `WSAEMSGSIZE` error on Windows and the "invalid argument" error on macOS.
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [`peek_from`]: method@Self::peek_from
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+    pub async fn peek_sender(&self) -> io::Result<SocketAddr> {
+        self.io
+            .registration()
+            .async_io(Interest::READABLE, || self.peek_sender_inner())
+            .await
+    }
+
+    /// Retrieve the sender of the data at the head of the input queue,
+    /// scheduling a wakeup if empty.
+    ///
+    /// This is equivalent to calling [`poll_peek_from`] with a zero-sized buffer,
+    /// but suppresses the `WSAEMSGSIZE` error on Windows and the "invalid argument" error on macOS.
+    ///
+    /// # Notes
+    ///
+    /// Note that on multiple calls to a `poll_*` method in the recv direction, only the
+    /// `Waker` from the `Context` passed to the most recent call will be scheduled to
+    /// receive a wakeup.
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [`poll_peek_from`]: method@Self::poll_peek_from
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+    pub fn poll_peek_sender(&self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<io::Result<SocketAddr>> {
+        self.io
+            .registration()
+            .poll_read_io(cx, || self.peek_sender_inner())
+    }
+
+    /// Try to retrieve the sender of the data at the head of the input queue.
+    ///
+    /// When there is no pending data, `Err(io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock)` is
+    /// returned. This function is usually paired with `readable()`.
+    ///
+    /// Note that the socket address **cannot** be implicitly trusted, because it is relatively
+    /// trivial to send a UDP datagram with a spoofed origin in a [packet injection attack].
+    /// Because UDP is stateless and does not validate the origin of a packet,
+    /// the attacker does not need to be able to intercept traffic in order to interfere.
+    /// It is important to be aware of this when designing your application-level protocol.
+    ///
+    /// [packet injection attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_injection
+    pub fn try_peek_sender(&self) -> io::Result<SocketAddr> {
+        self.io
+            .registration()
+            .try_io(Interest::READABLE, || self.peek_sender_inner())
+    }
+
+    #[inline]
+    fn peek_sender_inner(&self) -> io::Result<SocketAddr> {
+        self.io.try_io(|| {
+            self.as_socket()
+                .peek_sender()?
+                // May be `None` if the platform doesn't populate the sender for some reason.
+                // In testing, that only occurred on macOS if you pass a zero-sized buffer,
+                // but the implementation of `Socket::peek_sender()` covers that.
+                .as_socket()
+                .ok_or_else(|| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::Other, "sender not available"))
+        })
+    }
+
     /// Gets the value of the `SO_BROADCAST` option for this socket.
     ///
     /// For more information about this option, see [`set_broadcast`].

tokio/tests/udp.rs

@@ -106,6 +106,45 @@ async fn send_to_peek_from() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn send_to_try_peek_from() -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    let sender = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let receiver = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+
+    let receiver_addr = receiver.local_addr()?;
+    poll_fn(|cx| sender.poll_send_to(cx, MSG, receiver_addr)).await?;
+
+    // peek
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+
+    loop {
+        match receiver.try_peek_from(&mut recv_buf) {
+            Ok((n, addr)) => {
+                assert_eq!(&recv_buf[..n], MSG);
+                assert_eq!(addr, sender.local_addr()?);
+                break;
+            }
+            Err(e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
+                receiver.readable().await?;
+            }
+            Err(e) => return Err(e),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // peek
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+    let (n, addr) = receiver.peek_from(&mut recv_buf).await?;
+    assert_eq!(&recv_buf[..n], MSG);
+    assert_eq!(addr, sender.local_addr()?);
+
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+    let (n, addr) = receiver.recv_from(&mut recv_buf).await?;
+    assert_eq!(&recv_buf[..n], MSG);
+    assert_eq!(addr, sender.local_addr()?);
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn send_to_peek_from_poll() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     let sender = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
@@ -134,6 +173,92 @@ async fn send_to_peek_from_poll() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn peek_sender() -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    let sender = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let receiver = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+
+    let sender_addr = sender.local_addr()?;
+    let receiver_addr = receiver.local_addr()?;
+
+    let msg = b"Hello, world!";
+    sender.send_to(msg, receiver_addr).await?;
+
+    let peeked_sender = receiver.peek_sender().await?;
+    assert_eq!(peeked_sender, sender_addr);
+
+    // Assert that `peek_sender()` returns the right sender but
+    // doesn't remove from the receive queue.
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+    let (read, received_sender) = receiver.recv_from(&mut recv_buf).await?;
+
+    assert_eq!(&recv_buf[..read], msg);
+    assert_eq!(received_sender, peeked_sender);
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn poll_peek_sender() -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    let sender = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let receiver = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+
+    let sender_addr = sender.local_addr()?;
+    let receiver_addr = receiver.local_addr()?;
+
+    let msg = b"Hello, world!";
+    poll_fn(|cx| sender.poll_send_to(cx, msg, receiver_addr)).await?;
+
+    let peeked_sender = poll_fn(|cx| receiver.poll_peek_sender(cx)).await?;
+    assert_eq!(peeked_sender, sender_addr);
+
+    // Assert that `poll_peek_sender()` returns the right sender but
+    // doesn't remove from the receive queue.
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+    let mut read = ReadBuf::new(&mut recv_buf);
+    let received_sender = poll_fn(|cx| receiver.poll_recv_from(cx, &mut read)).await?;
+
+    assert_eq!(read.filled(), msg);
+    assert_eq!(received_sender, peeked_sender);
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn try_peek_sender() -> std::io::Result<()> {
+    let sender = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let receiver = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+
+    let sender_addr = sender.local_addr()?;
+    let receiver_addr = receiver.local_addr()?;
+
+    let msg = b"Hello, world!";
+    sender.send_to(msg, receiver_addr).await?;
+
+    let peeked_sender = loop {
+        match receiver.try_peek_sender() {
+            Ok(peeked_sender) => break peeked_sender,
+            Err(ref e) if e.kind() == io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock => {
+                receiver.readable().await?;
+            }
+            Err(e) => return Err(e),
+        }
+    };
+
+    assert_eq!(peeked_sender, sender_addr);
+
+    // Assert that `try_peek_sender()` returns the right sender but
+    // didn't remove from the receive queue.
+    let mut recv_buf = [0u8; 32];
+    // We already peeked the sender so there must be data in the receive queue.
+    let (read, received_sender) = receiver.try_recv_from(&mut recv_buf).unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(&recv_buf[..read], msg);
+    assert_eq!(received_sender, peeked_sender);
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn split() -> std::io::Result<()> {
     let socket = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;